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Can Austerity Lead to
Recentralisation? Italian Local
Government during the Economic
Crisis
Silvia Bolgherini
The relationship between the remarkable changes that have occurred at the local level and
the overlapping crises affecting Italy in recent years has yet to be fully tackled by political
scientists. This article aims to contribute to the debate by arguing that anti-crisis measures
have also produced structural effects that may actually weaken Italian local autonomies,
suggesting the existence of an ongoing recentralisation. Several major questions are
addressed: is such a trend inversion (from decentralisation to recentralisation) really
taking place? Which dimensions should be analysed to detect it? What outcomes and
effects have these measures provoked in Italian local government?
Keywords: Italy; Local Government; Eurozone Crisis; Decentralisation; Recentralisation
The global financial crisis that exploded in the United States (US) in 2007–08 and the
Eurozone crisis affecting European Union (EU) member states since 2009–10 have
prompted European countries to re-examine, among other major issues, the role of
central states and of local autonomies. While there is no question that decentralisation
has been one of the major trends in Europe since the 1960s, with a peak in the 1990s
(Sharpe 1979; 1993; Bobbio 2002), some doubt may be cast on its enduring dominance
in the current period, opening up the possibility that a different trend has begun. Due to
the impact of the above-mentioned crises, the drive towards decentralisation seems in
fact to have come to an end, paving the way for recentralisation in the hands of the
central authorities, mainly realised through austerity measures. The shift towards this
renewed role of the centre is often tied in with the debate about the global and Eurozone
crises, as a stronger role of central governments may be justified by the need to tackle
urgent issues rapidly and effectively (Hodson 2011, p. 9; Dyson 2012, p. 796; Fabbrini
2013, p. 1022). This new ‘central empowerment’ may also impact on local government.
The aim of this article is to investigate whether this is occurring in the Italian case.
q 2014 Taylor & Francis
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Recentralisation may, on the one hand, be induced by the crises. Notably, the need
to comply with EU agreements and the consequent austerity measures imposed by
central governments inevitably affect sub-national levels as well. On the other hand,
this phenomenon may not necessarily be related, or not uniquely so, to the crises: such
a trend, especially in some countries, appears to have been already underway, implying
it has other causes.1 In the Italian case, several scholars have suggested that the crises
induced a centralising direction in the sub-national government reforms in the middle
of the last decade (Mangiameli 2013; Perulli 2010; Piperata 2012) and recall the recent
binding EU agreements as crucial to understanding this course (Dickmann 2012).
Until now, the relationship between the crises and the recent local-level changes that
have taken place in Italy has been investigated principally by legal scientists and, of
course, by political economists. However, political-science-oriented research has yet to
be conducted on this topic. This article aims to contribute to the debate on this issue
within this discipline. The thesis proposed here is that, following a period of strong
momentum for local authorities and a dominant pro-decentralisation approach, a
trend inversion – that is to say, recentralisation – has been taking place since around
the mid-2000s. Just as in previous decades Italy decentralised along with many other
European countries (Bobbio 2002), so too it is not alone now in experiencing this
trend inversion (Viver 2010). Nonetheless, some particular (and contradictory)
conditions make Italy a particularly interesting case for examination.
During the earlier phase of decentralisation, Italy started a quasi-federalist
programme (Lippi 2011), which led it to become a strongly regionalised and would-be
federal country. When the trend inversion started, the quasi-federalist programme was
still ongoing. The result was a phase of superimposed contradictory drives, resulting in
a kind of ‘bridge period’, from 2007 to 2011, during which the effects counterbalanced
each other and there was uncertainty what the outcomes were going to be. Party
politics played a major part in this dynamic. The role and importance of party politics
in territorial reforms (Toubeau & Massetti 2013) or constitutional change (Behnke &
Benz 2009) has been extensively analysed, also in relation to Italy (Keating & Wilson
2010; Massetti & Toubeau 2013; Mazzoleni 2009), and it will not be our focus here.
It is nonetheless relevant to our perspective that the fiercest supporter of federalism
and devolution among the Italian political parties, the Lega Nord (Northern League,
LN), was in power during some of the crucial years of the trend inversion from
decentralisation to recentralisation. If the role of LN has been recognised as crucial in
pushing the Italian government towards a federalist path (Baldini & Baldi 2013), often
by setting the agenda and forcing other parties to adapt their strategies to this issue
(Massetti 2012), it is nonetheless also true that the demands of this party have moved
from federalism to secession, and from devolution to fiscal federalism, with the result
that it has become a case of simulative politics (Cento Bull 2009, p. 141) rather than
adopting a strictly coherent strategy on this matter, as its regionalist nature might have
led one to expect. In fact, during the recent fiscal federalism reform, the LN did
not display a marked political determination to avoid recentralisation measures
(Massetti 2012), resulting in a basic, and paradoxical, lack of importance of this party
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in the de- or recentralisation issue. However, the LN’s exit from government in 2011
probably eased the introduction of more pro-centralisation measures.
Against this intriguing background the questions addressed in this article concern
the presence of a recentralisation trend at the local level and its effects: how and where
can this trend be detected? How does this trend inversion actually affect Italian local
government and which aspects does it mostly affect? To answer these questions, the
article examines the evolution of Italian local government following the national
measures introduced during the years of crises. After clarifying, in the following
section, some theoretical issues and the consequent expectations concerning the
above-posed questions, in section three an attempt is made to build up a picture of the
peculiar systemic conditions characterising Italy in these years. Section four shows that
Italy was implementing decentralisation measures at least until 2009, while in section
five the recentralisation trend is assessed by analysing national provisions concerning
the local level introduced between 2007 and 2013. The last section offers a further
interpretation and some concluding remarks.
Recentralisation at the Local Level
A certain oscillation between centre and periphery, that is, between localism and
neo-centralism, is not a novelty in political-institutional arrangements, either in Italy
(Diamanti 2003) or in general (Peters, Pierre & Randma-Liiv 2011). Following a
widely recognised decentralisation trend in Italy (Bobbio 2002; Baldi 2003), debate
has started in scholarly circles about whether a process of recentralisation – that is,
a re-convergence of powers and resources in the hands of the central authorities – may
now be underway.2 The phenomenon seems to affect all sub-national levels, including
the regions, but the focus here will be on the local – municipal and second-tier – level
only, and its possible retrenchment to the benefit of the central state.
Page and Goldsmith (1987) consider three dimensions in evaluating local
government autonomy: the functional responsibilities of local governments
(functions), the capacity of local levels to make decisions about the type of services
they deliver and about how they should be provided and financed (discretion), and the
way local interests are represented and lobbied at higher levels of government (access).
These dimensions are partly echoed by Vandelli (2012a), who divides the features of
autonomy into three categories: activity (the functions local governments have),
organisation (the possibility of choosing the way administrative bodies are structured)
and guarantees (protection from legislative or administrative intrusion on the part of
other levels of government). Braun (2000) distinguishes between a sub-national
government’s right-to-decide (level and type of decision-making, i.e. what can be
done) and right-to-act (policy-making and implementation, i.e. how to do it). The
latter is very close to the discretion/organisation dimension and both are highly related
to the guarantees aspect.
Drawing on this literature, an attempt will be made to detect signs of
recentralisation in Italian local government. This will be done first of all by focusing
[Q1]
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on the organisation/discretion dimension, defined here as the capacity of local
governments to use their right-to-act to choose or implement their priorities, and
to use their resources according to their own preferences, which are not imposed by
central government. If such a capacity also implies freedom to choose their internal
administrative organisation, then the top-down introduction of prescriptive rules
about the ordinary working of local autonomies may signal the empowerment of
central levels. If, unlike in the past, the national government is now able to impose its
choices on or have a say in the inner organisation and discretional choices of local
bodies, one can reasonably expect to find a recentralisation trend.
Admittedly, substantial changes have also occurred on a broader scale: the forms
and types of Italian local government have been radically modified by recent
provisions. Focusing on these changes as well, which mainly concern second-tier
authorities, will enable us to ascertain whether the possibility for local governments to
choose without being constrained or trespassed on by an upper level has remained
unaltered or not (a sort of discretion/guarantees dimension). It can be argued that the
more constraining the state rules determining which local authorities may exist and
with which requirements, the higher the recentralisation. If in fact, through normative
acts, higher-ranked authorities may now further invade self-government spaces
and, in contrast to the past, impose more constraining non-negotiable institutional
arrangements on local bodies, then we have a shrinking of the guarantees of local levels
as well as of their right-to-act and a recentralisation trend can be said to be under way.
Although these two focuses are still somewhat rough and ready, and will
undoubtedly need to be further refined in future research, a first tentative analysis may
nonetheless be ventured in order to appreciate comprehensively the changes at stake in
local government.
The systemic conditions where changes and recentralisation may be singled out are
embedded in quite a complex environment. Italian local government changes are in
fact proceeding in the crisis-induced austerity environment. The main goals of the
austerity measures that have been decided on are to comply with EU economic
governance agreements and to avoid the collapse of Italy’s public finances. However,
under the umbrella of austerity and the consequent resource cuts it entails, many
other measures have affected local governments, all potentially leading toward a
re-empowerment of the central authorities. These measures range from simple
revisions of a particular local feature to broader attempts at territorial reform.
Among the various theoretical arguments concerning the initiation of territorial
reforms, two will be advanced here to explain recent territorial reforms in Italy.
The first argument is that, although there is a tendency not to attempt reforms in times
of crisis (Pola 2010), due to their high costs and low rewards, this has not been the case
in Italy. On the contrary, innovations have been introduced in periods of severe crises;
the latter seem to have opened a sort of macro-policy window (Keeler 1993, p. 436) for
territorial reforms, and to have created a sense of urgency to act, in order to avoid
worse consequences caused by inaction (Keeler 1993, p. 441). The rapid succession of
local government changes and reform attempts seems to confirm this. The second
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argument claims that territorial reforms are initiated when local governments fail
to provide effective public services (Wollmann 2008) or fragmentation is extremely
high (Swianiewicz 2010a), resulting in a need for rationalisation. Italy may be a case in
point, if one thinks of the small municipalities but also of the provinces and the
decade-long debate about the need for their rationalisation.
Both arguments become stronger if framed in the context of the domestic crises that
rendered territorial reform politically necessary for the prestige of the political class, as
will be discussed later. Moreover, the strong austerity target has often cast a shadow
over all other purposes of local government reforms, and the changes introduced
thus seem to be disconnected from a genuinely comprehensive project (Gardini 2011,
p. 458) that looks beyond expenditure cutbacks. The result is a series of syncopated
territorial reform efforts and scattered innovations.
In the light of all these arguments, our expectation is that, along with the outcomes
of austerity measures, other effects will nevertheless also emerge from the qualitative
analysis of the 2007–13 provisions. It is expected that the latter will affect Italian local
governments in a restrictive sense, to the advantage of a strengthened central power,
thus proving or pointing towards the existence of a recentralisation trend in contrast
to the previously dominant decentralisation approach.
Italy: More than a Single Crisis
It is worth reiterating that the trend inversion from a decentralising to a recentralising
approach should be understood in the context of a series of superimposed crises that
have affected Italy in recent years. The global recession and the Eurozone crisis hit Italy
hard. Combined with a 20-year-long decline in the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP) (Di Quirico 2010; Simoni 2012), they inevitably had a deep impact on the real
economy: a high rate of companies going bust, a sharp drop in the number of
self-employed, increasing numbers of families on the verge of poverty, difficulties for
the younger generations in finding a job and therefore in starting a family, buying a
house and making a living. Needless to say, this triggered a severe social crisis,
although it has not (yet) developed into open rebellion or street demonstrations, as in
Spain and Greece (Zamponi 2012). Without a doubt, however, there was a strong
expression of discontent with representative democracy (Della Porta & Andretta
2013). This discontent predictably spilled over into a governmental crisis, the troubled
life of the Berlusconi IV government (inaugurated in 2008) reaching a peak in the
summer of 2011, when the European Central Bank and the International Monetary
Fund called for radical reforms, which the government failed to deliver (Jones 2012).
Berlusconi’s cabinet (and its supporting majority) survived a few more months, before
resigning on 11 November.
This was not just a question of governmental turbulence: it appeared that the
country’s political system was in crisis and the very functioning of the Italian system
was at stake. Firstly, political parties proved inadequate to tackling the crises (Bosco &
McDonnell 2012; Ceccarini, Diamanti & Lazar 2012), as indicated by the inability of
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Berlusconi’s majority to govern and of the opposition forces to present a viable
alternative. In the most dramatic months of 2011–12, parties were sidelined first by
the President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, who played the key role in the
formation of the Monti government and then by the latter as the most technocratic
administration Italy has ever had (Marangoni 2012). Secondly, the decision-making
and crisis-resolver function of the President of the Republic (Grimaldi 2012) grew to
such an extent that it may cast doubt on the very nature of parliamentary government
in Italy. Thirdly, following the installation of the Monti government, some analysts
argued that Italy – along with Greece, which had also installed a technocratic
executive – had a limited sovereignty, as its government lacked electoral legitimacy
and exogenous pressures had contributed to its creation. Disappointment with
the poor performance of the technocratic government led to a further increase
in social and political discontent as showed by the results of the February 2013 snap
elections.3
It was in this complex context, resulting from an overlapping of several external and
domestic crises, that recentralisation began to appear in local government policy.
Apart from meeting the EU’s balanced budget provisions, austerity measures also had
a domestic purpose as the political class needed to regain credibility among citizens.
But before embarking on an examination of the provisions implemented in these crisis
years, it is worth presenting a picture of the preceding phase of decentralisation.
1990–2009: Growing Local Autonomies
In order to claim that a recentralisation trend is underway, it must necessarily be
assumed that an opposite trend was previously dominant. This was precisely the case
in Italy: from the early 1990s until the mid-2000s Italian sub-national government
experienced an extraordinary degree of empowerment. From being quite weak
(Baccetti 2011, pp. 164–165; Vandelli 2013, pp. 21–28), it gradually acquired
considerable autonomy and a quasi-federalist structure (Lippi 2011). This
empowerment resulted from both political and administrative innovations.
Italy’s sub-national levels consist of 20 regions (Regioni), of which 15 have ordinary
and five have special status, 110 provinces (Province) and over 8,000 municipalities
(Comuni). The soon-to-be-created metropolitan cities (Citta` metropolitane) and the
intermunicipalities, especially the municipal unions (Unioni di comuni) and the
mountain communities (Comunita` montane, MCs), form the intermediate or second-
tier level together with the provinces. The municipalities and second-tier authorities
form the local level. The provinces were created following Italian unification and
steadily grew in number. However, they suffered a political decline between the
1960s and the 1980s, squeezed between the growing roles of the regions and
the municipalities and deprived of many competences, which were transferred to these
two other levels (Baccetti 2011, p. 168). They then enjoyed a revival during the reforms
in the 1990s, when they were granted new competences, before entering a new critical
period in the 2000s. The intermunicipalities, on the other hand, were first established
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in Italy in the 1970s, but it was only during the late 1990s and early 2000s that they
grew in importance and numbers (Bolgherini 2011). In the last few years they have
been gathering a new momentum. They are usually regarded, as in most European
countries, as a tool for tackling financial, organisational, dimensional and expertise
deficits affecting (mostly small) municipalities.
The direct election of mayors and the provincial presidents was introduced in Italy
in 1993 with the purpose of enhancing local government performance. In 1999 direct
elections were also introduced for regional presidents, thus completing the direct
legitimisation of the sub-national governing institutions. This instituted a major
shift toward a neo-parliamentarian regime at the sub-national level (Fabbrini 2001;
Di Virgilio 2010, p. 63), entailing the direct election of the chief of the executive and
establishing the principle of simul stabunt simul cadent. The latter means that the fall of
the government entails the dissolution of the assembly and hence new elections, thus
reducing the probability of a crisis.
For Italian local and regional governments, these reforms ensured greater
governability and the so-called mandate-long executives, that is, sub-national
governments that remained in office for the whole four or five years of their mandate
(Di Virgilio 2005; Baldini 2002). But the direct election of the executives also
represented a strong impetus to strengthen sub-national authorities, in both their
decision- and policy-making powers. Mayors and provincial and regional presidents
gained a new visibility as well as a more accountable and responsible role towards their
fellow citizens and electors. They also secured greater autonomy from the influence of
political parties in local political life. The 1993 and 1999 electoral laws introduced
a majoritarian style in sub-national government, thereby shifting Italy from a
consensual towards a majoritarian model of democracy as well as towards a more
personalised and presidentialised (Calise 2006; 2010) pattern of local and regional
government.
Innovations of comparable magnitude also occurred in administration. At the
beginning of the 1990s, a ground-breaking law (Law no. 142/1990) revised sub-national
authorities’ competences, thus initiating the most far-reaching administrative reform
ever undertaken in Italian republican history. For the first time, the statutory autonomy
of municipalities and provinces was recognised, the functions of bureaucrats and
politicians were separated and distinguished and a closer relationship was fostered
between citizens and administrations.
Some years later, in 1997, so-called administrative federalism was launched, as the
core of the re-organisation of administrative inter-institutional relations. This was an
ambitious reform aimed at functional decentralisation and procedural simplification
from the central state to the local levels without changing the Constitution
(Vandelli 2013; Baldi 2003; 2006).4 The scope and number of areas affected by the
devolution of powers towards regional and local government were unprecedented.
Moreover, state controls over sub-national authorities were reduced, and
centre–periphery inter-institutional arenas were promoted instead. Decision-making
and organisational autonomy were strengthened through norms that gave mayors
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full responsibility for matters such as the management of human resources and
administrative structures; local financial taxes were also toughened, thus shifting from
a (mainly) state-transfer-dependent system to a (mostly) local-taxes-based system
(Vandelli 2005).
In 2000, a major law on local authorities – called the TUEL (Testo Unico sugli Enti
Locali) or Consolidated Act – summed up and coordinated the wide-ranging
legislative reforms and provisions carried out in the previous decade, thus giving
Italian local government the first composite, organic and systematic normative
framework. The 2000s began in the same climate. In 2001 the reform of Title V of the
Italian Constitution, the most large-scale constitutional reform in the country’s
history to date, was approved. This reform left a federalist and regionalist mark on the
institutional configuration of the country, introducing a federal-like system. The main
innovations (Vandelli 2013, pp. 41–49) concerned new powers for the regions (in
particular by enumerating, in art. 117, the state’s exclusive legislative powers and
leaving all the rest to the regions, thus reversing the pre-existing principle of the state’s
residual powers), as well as the explicit statement, in art. 114, that the Italian Republic
‘is composed of the Municipalities, the Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities, the Regions
and the State’, and that all these ‘are autonomous entities endowed with their own
statutes, powers and functions’ (thus conferring on sub-national authorities a
constitutionally guaranteed status as constituent parts of the Republic). Moreover,
increased autonomy was also granted to local and regional government finances: art.
119 stated that all sub-national authorities ‘have financial autonomy over revenues
and expenditures’, as well as autonomous resources in order to finance their public
functions. In 2005, the centre-right government made an attempt to modify the
constitution (the so-called devolution reform), but it was rejected the following year
by a popular referendum.
In 2009, fiscal federalism was approved, that is, a form of financing territorial
autonomies based on the correspondence between revenues and the financial
resources available at (and raised by) the same territorial level, and on the principles of
autonomy, responsibility, coordination, cohesion and solidarity (Bassanini 2010;
Caravita 2011). From the outset, this law presented a number of flaws, focusing
as it did mainly on public expenditure cuts without devolving significant fiscal
powers (Baldi & Tronconi 2011); it was also the last major provision in the
pro-decentralisation trend that can be clearly detected.5
Summing up, in this period Italian sub-national government became much
stronger as regards autonomy, competences and relations with the citizens, acquiring
greater freedom of manoeuvre in terms of organisation, decision-making and
finance. The main innovations introduced in the period 1990–2009 are displayed in
Table 1. Sub-national government was reshaped into a more flexible as well as a
more managerial administrative organisation, thus becoming the forerunner of
institutional change in Italy. In other words, this was the period, in Italy, of the
shift from a centralised state to one based on local and regional autonomies (Baccetti
2008, p. 109).
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2007–2013: The Step Back in Local Government – a Qualitative Assessment
The changes introduced since the peak of the international 2007–08 crisis, contrary to
what had happened in the preceding period, seem to represent a backward step for
sub-national governments, together with a parallel recentralisation. With regard to
the local level, as noted in section two, the reforms of these years were strongly
characterised by austerity and can thus be labelled cutback reforms. They increased in
number and scope during the following years and throughout 2012, before coming to
a halt for several months due to the resignation of the Monti government in December
2012 and the electoral campaign for the February 2013 legislative elections. In summer
2013 the Letta government, supported by a Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic
Party)/Popolo della Liberta` (PdL, People of Freedom) grand coalition, finally
succeeded Monti after a long stalemate resulting from the 2013 elections, and started
re-launching the territorial reform issue.
At first glance, the measures introduced in the period under consideration,
and illustrated in detail in Table 2, display an incredible degree of normative
fragmentation, which hinders a comprehensive understanding. Nonetheless, the
insistence on public expenditure cutbacks is evident: throughout 2009 and 2010 tough
financial cuts were made in state transfers to local bodies, calculated in proportion to
their population.6 In the following year this trend became even more marked.
An emergency economic measure approved in the middle of the summer of 2011
further cut state financial transfers to local governments, particularly those for social
policies and infrastructures (Gardini 2011, p. 458).
But, if the conjecture proposed here is valid, these very same provisions also severely
impacted on the structural (and not only the financial) side of local government.
Therefore, as anticipated in section two, an attempt will be made in the following
pages to assess this impact by examining the major provisions of this period: their
impact on the organisation/discretion dimension will be considered first; then an
analysis will be made of the various attempts to modify forms and options for second-
tier authorities.
Organisation/Discretion
Since 2007, and particularly until 2010, most of the cutbacks have also affected the
internal functioning of local governments. In 2007 the national budget law made
provision for the reduction (or abolition) of all municipal agencies and bodies that
performed basic municipal functions. Municipalities were no longer allowed to set up
agencies to carry out functions, services or activities on their behalf, thus limiting
their autonomy and self-organisation powers. A year later, the creation of municipal
functional consortiums (bodies implementing administrative acts or pursuing public
interests on behalf of municipalities) was forbidden as well. In 2009, again in the
national budget law, there was a reduction of almost 20 per cent in the number of
representatives and executive members of all municipalities and provinces. The same
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law (no. 191/2009) also abolished city districts (decentralised municipal organisations
called circoscrizioni) for cities with a population of under 250,000. In addition, it
envisaged the abolition of several administrative positions introduced in the previous
decade, which had contributed to the renovation of Italian local government described
in the previous section.
These included the municipal ombudsman, an institution that now survives only at
the provincial level. The post of director-general was suppressed as well. Created in the
1990s in order to achieve a more flexible and managerial approach to the management
of human resources in local government, the position of director-general was an
important instrument of differentiation and autonomy for mayors and municipalities
(Vandelli 2012b, pp. 339–340). In 2010, the role of the municipal and provincial clerk
(or secretary) was significantly revised. In the 1990s, the municipal clerk had gained
more autonomy from the Ministry of the Interior (to which they had previously been
answerable) through the creation of an independent agency employing these clerks,
who could then be selected and appointed directly by the mayors. Instead, in 2010, the
independent agency was abolished and the position was brought back under the
Ministry (Vandelli 2012b, pp. 338–339). The Ministry of the Interior has therefore
regained control of a key position in municipalities, in particular in smaller ones: in
fact, the clerks are responsible for a wide range of functions, as they oversee or even
directly execute all the activities of the municipality.
The combined effect of these provisions has tended to diminish local authorities’
discretion and capacity for autonomous organisation by significantly reducing their
room for manoeuvre and placing greater power in the hands of central authorities.
Which Second-Tier Bodies?
The reforms of 2007–13 also affect second-tier authorities, i.e. the provinces and
intermunicipalities. The latter entail forms of intermunicipal cooperation that
envisage the creation of new entities composed of more than one municipality. In the
crisis years, this tier of local government has been targeted to an exceptional degree: on
the one hand, through provisions that significantly fostered intermunicipality and, on
the other, through a series of attempted reforms aimed at substantially modifying the
provinces. The main goals of both types of interventions, besides the obvious
expenditure savings, were: to tackle the problem of municipal fragmentation (that is,
the large number of efficiency-lacking medium-small and very small municipalities);
to reduce the number of local authorities, in particular the provinces; and to thin out
local apparatuses. As has been noted in other national contexts, such goals usually
entail the merging, suppression or reduction of local bodies in a rationalisation
perspective (Hulst & Van Montfort 2007; Swianiewicz 2010b), likely to involve
substantial changes to the rules and forms of local authorities.
In the Italian case, as far as the intermunicipalities are concerned, until the mid-
2000s local authorities could freely choose the cooperation form that suited them best.
But since 2007, and with a strong impetus since 2010, the national government has
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been intervening directly. For instance, in order to tackle (at least partially) the
inefficiencies of small municipalities, those with a population of less than 5,000 have
been obliged to manage their compulsory basic tasks (administration, police, school,
transport, territory management, social care) through a municipal union (MU).
Furthermore, all municipalities with under 1,000 inhabitants have been compelled to
do the same also for all their administrative functions and public services. Considering
that currently 70.4 per cent of Italy’s 8,094 municipalities have fewer than 5,000
inhabitants – of which around 2,000 have less than 1,000 inhabitants – it is evident
that this provision could significantly limit the autonomy of the majority of Italian
local administrations. It may thus be considered a rough indicator of recentralisation.
Moreover, while several intermunicipal options were previously available, the
number has effectively been reduced to just one, the municipal union. Consequently,
the number of s rose sharply from 271 in 2006 to 370 in 2013, while the old
cooperation form of the MCs – established in 1971 and foreseen for municipalities
located in mountainous areas – began to be dismantled in 2008, when their drastic
reduction was decided at a national level, and each region was forced to reduce their
number: Italian MCs fell from 300 to 223. Currently, their very existence is at risk: state
financial transfers to these intermunicipal forms have been totally cancelled and the
regions tend simply to abolish them (Palazzi 2012, pp. 4–5). This is clearly the result of
a centralised provision that has had a structural effect on the very existence of some
local authorities, by promoting one form and hindering another.
Moving on to the provinces, this becomes even clearer. The provinces have been
particularly affected by the cutback reforms, and their case is emblematic in showing
how financial and structural issues are entangled. Targeted as one of the financial black
holes of Italy’s public administration, the provinces have been at the centre of a series
of attempts at territorial-institutional change, all entailing their merging or even
suppression. The suppression of the smaller provinces was explicitly envisaged during
the last months of the Berlusconi IV government in 2011, but the provision in
question was then dropped. Just a few months later, however, the newly installed
Monti government intervened on this issue even more radically. Through the ‘Rescue
Italy’ decree, the technocratic government suppressed the provinces’ executive body
(Giunta) and made provision for the transfer of many provincial functions to regions,
municipalities or intermunicipal authorities. Moreover, the indirect election of the
provincial president and council was introduced. The suppression of the smaller
provinces was once again included in the subsequent spending review decrees, which
also revised their competences: they were now to manage territorial planning and
environmental issues (in particular waste disposal), transport and roads, while all
other competences were devolved to municipalities. Provinces that did not meet
certain population and territorial requirements were to merge with bigger adjoining
ones. But the final decree law, which would have reduced the current 86 provinces
(in the ordinary statute regions) to 51, was never converted into law. In December
2012, a week before Monti announced the resignation of his government, the decree
law was in fact dropped, due to the huge number of requested amendments and
[Q2]
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widespread local government opposition. The ‘freezing’ of the reform and its
‘suspension’ until December 2013 were established in the financial stability law for
2013 (no. 228/2012). During 2013 the Letta government proposed both a draft decree
law – that foresees a territorial articulation where provinces (with their functions) are
replaced by other territorial bodies such as municipal unions – and a constitutional
amendment that drops all mention of provinces from the Constitution, which
would consequently permit their ultimate suppression as local authorities. But the
controversies on this issue are still inflaming political debate and no clear development
is discernible yet.
The evidence gathered and presented thus far, and summarised in Table 3, confirms
the claim that a recentralisation trend is underway. What has been presented above is a
preliminary qualitative assessment of the structural effects of crises-led measures on
Italian local government. Despite the need for better refinement and systematisation of
the analysis, at this first stage the evidence provides solid grounds for affirming that a
recentralisation trend has begun in Italian local government: the capacity for
organisation/discretion has lessened, and the options for second-tier authorities have
been altered by new and direct central intervention. Both are clearly in contrast with
the trend over the previous decade.
Moreover the presence of a sort of bridge period can be detected in the years
2007–11, when an interesting intersection of trends took place. Decentralisation was
still ongoing, as the last federalist measure was the approval of fiscal federalism in
2009, and its legislative decrees were slowly approved, mainly in 2010–11. At the same
time, recentralisation was already beginning, if the first measures in this direction are
considered to be those passed in 2007. Especially from 2010, they became increasingly
dominant. In this limbo period, contradictory drives pushed in different directions
and overlapped with each other, thus creating a sort of transition period from
decentralisation to recentralisation. The uncertainty of this phase is even more marked
if one considers that recentralisation was (and still is) not officially supported, and
speeches are still made about the ongoing federalist project (Gardini 2011, p. 457).
Table 3 Collected Evidence of Recentralisation Trend: An Overview
Concerning organisation/discretion
Suppression of municipal agencies
Reduction of local councillors
Suppression of inner city districts
Suppression of several administrative key positions
Revision of provincial bodies
Concerning second-tier authorities’ options
Compulsory intermunicipality for municipal basic tasks – under 5,000 inhabitants
Compulsory intermunicipality for all municipal administrative tasks – under 1,000 inhabitants
Only municipal unions fostered as intermunicipalities
Disappearance of MCs
Foreseen suppression/merging/suppression again (?) of the provinces
Source: Author’s compilation.
[Q3]
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At the moment it seems to be more a de facto trend inversion, not yet recognised in
political discourse, rather than an official position supported by the government or
by some other political force.
Local Government Changes in Italy in Times of Crisis: Goals, Outcomes
and Side Effects
It has been argued both that crisis-driven and austerity-related measures have had
systemic effects and that they have combined with other reform goals pertaining to
local government. It is worth focusing now on this aspect in more depth. Starting from
what Lippi (2011) argued about the Italian quasi-federalist programme in the 1990s
and taking some categories and concepts from his analysis, it is possible to single out,
as shown in Table 4, two main purposes of the 2007–13 measures: on the one hand,
the introduction of a savings-oriented budget discipline; on the other hand, the
rationalisation of local government architecture.
Compliance with budgetary discipline by all local authorities concerned is widely
expected: sharp cutbacks affecting all public administrations are in fact planned for the
following years and financial allocations have also been reduced (Ragioneria Generale
dello Stato [RGS] 2013, pp. 2–3), although it will only be possible to calculate the real
savings, that is, the observed outcomes, at a later stage. The rationalisation goal may have
at least three expected outcomes, ranging from a reduction (or at least reorganisation)
of the number of local authorities (especially provinces but also intermunicipal
cooperations), to a better distribution of powers and competences at all local levels, and a
reshaping of the territorial borders of municipalities and second-tier authorities.
As described in the previous section, the observed outcomes of this second goal
present a differentiated picture. In relation to the number of local authorities, there
have been some attempts to reduce the number of provinces, though the figure is still
stuck at 110. Meanwhile, the promotion of the intermunicipality has led to a steady
increase in the number of municipal unions and to a parallel and interdependent
decrease in the MCs. The ban on the multiplication of memberships in municipal
unions, as well as on the creation of new functional consortiums, can also be counted
among the observed effects of the goal of rationalisation.
The expected improvement in power distribution is more difficult to observe.
As described previously, several normative acts in the last few years (2011–13 in
particular) were designed to reallocate a certain number of competences among
provinces, municipalities and intermunicipalities, but with uncertain outcomes: some
of these reallocations have already been decided and others not; yet others depend on
the final approval of the reform of the provinces. Consequently, the final reshaping of
territorial borders between municipalities, metropolitan cities and provinces remains
hypothetical, as the process has been suspended until the constitutional and legislative
arrangements have been defined.
Besides the expected and observed outcomes, there are also indirect ones, namely
results not explicitly foreseen or planned by governmental measures. One of these is
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the reduction of municipal services that many local authorities were forced to
implement: the harsh financial cuts first of all led local governments to reduce
services in order to save money (Gardini 2011, p. 458), as well as to suspend, or even
block, many already-planned territorial projects (Perulli 2010, p. 386). Furthermore,
many local administrations have been forced to increase local taxes in order to
maintain the same provision and/or standards of services (CGIA 2013). The
forthcoming phasing out of the MCs, which is a direct effect of the end of state
transfers for these intermunicipal forms, should also be mentioned here. While these
indirect outcomes may mostly be related to the budgetary goal of institutional policy,
the phenomenon of over-legislation and of a patchwork set of norms can paradoxically
be associated mainly (though not exclusively) with the goal of rationalisation.
The toing and froing over the revision of the provinces, and partially of the
intermunicipalities as well, is striking. But the spending-review-oriented norms have
also often turned out to be scattered, non-homogeneous and contradictory (Gardini
2011, pp. 458–459).
Finally, another indirect outcome is rising competition among local authorities.
This undoubtedly relates to economic and financial resources and transfers, but also
involves competence allocation and power sharing. The existence of traditional
rivalries between provinces, regions and municipalities on questions of respective
competences is perhaps more solidly grounded now, and could focus on
intermunicipal cooperation: this is openly promoted and sometimes imposed, thus
endangering the room for manoeuvre and the powers of the historical intermediate
level (the province). But such competition has now also started among local bodies of
the same category. Which (if any) of the provinces that are borderline regarding the
fulfilment of demographic–territorial requirements will survive, and thus maintain
their own apparatus and denomination, is a key question and has already triggered
ferocious lobbying and power struggles. The same may hold true for intermunicipal
cooperation: the case of the MCs, which,besides competing with the municipal unions
are now battling amongst themselves for survival, is emblematic.
The 2007–13 provisions on local government also produced side effects, that is,
impacts outside the reform’s target area (Lippi 2011, p. 497). Each and every one of
them may pose a threat to current local autonomies, thus reinforcing the
recentralisation trend. Three of these side effects will be briefly discussed here.
A first effect is the reduction of proximity. The recent reforms abolished the
municipal ombudsman and cut the number of representatives in local assemblies. Both
these provisions may have an impact on citizen–administration relationships, in this
case making contact more difficult and indirect. Moreover, the compulsory joint
management of services and functions formunicipalities under 5,000 inhabitants, along
with compulsory association into a municipal union for those under 1,000 – though
somewhat tempered by subsequent acts (in 2010–12) – represents a move towards a
reshaping of local government on an intermediate level. This leaves the municipal level,
replaced by the intermunicipal bodies, marginal as regards functions and services
provision.
[Q5]
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This effect is linked in a complementary fashion to the second one: the increase in
the deficit in democratic legitimacy. The indirect election of provincial executive
bodies as well as the suppression of the provincial assembly clearly inhibits a
traditional channel of local representation, thus depriving citizens from having a direct
say in local democracy. Moreover, the municipal unions also have indirectly elected
steering and decision-making bodies. Their executive committee is in fact formed by
the mayors of the member municipalities and by some chosen councillors. This means
that citizens have their basic services provided (and decided) more and more by local
authorities whose decision-makers they cannot choose, thus creating an issue as far as
the indirect election of these bodies is concerned.
A third major and more comprehensive effect may be that of further threatening the
already uncertain path of Italian federalism. The federalist structure envisaged by the
2001 constitutional reform encountered implementation problems from the very
beginning (Vandelli 2013, pp. 49, 56), thereby condemning the country to a hybrid
situation: a federal-like outline with a blurred shape (Baldi & Baldini 2008; Cotta &
Verzichelli 2011, pp. 214–215), even more so after the introduction of fiscal federalism
in 2009 (Bassanini & Vandelli 2012; Caravita 2011; Baldi 2010). The point is that
expenditure cutbacks have been loaded on the local authorities’ shoulders, while
state transfers towards them have almost completely stopped (Viesti 2010). As a
consequence, the very essence of the federal objective, that is, the autonomy of
sub-national levels, has effectively been hindered. In this perspective, there is a risk that
the reforms of the last few years, and the provisions concerning local government
in Italy, will give rise to an even more hybrid situation, with a never-suppressed
(and now returning) centralisation and an as-yet unborn federalism as the ultimate
step of decentralisation.
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Notes
1. For example, the still evolving centre–periphery relationships, as in the case of Spain
(Maiz, Caaman˜o & Azpitarte 2010).
2. Unlike decentralisation, which is clearly a political issue in Italy, as shown by both research data
and literature, recentralisation is still a barely discernible trend. No political actor has openly
declared a policy strategy in this direction. Nonetheless, scientific literature on this topic, though
still limited almost exclusively to legal studies, considers that a process of recentralisation has
started.
3. On this topic, see the special issue of Contemporary Italian Politics, vol. 5, nos 1–2, 2013.
4. The administrative federalism laws, approved between 1997 and 1999 and known as the
‘Bassanini Laws’ after Franco Bassanini, the minister who proposed them. This set of laws is also
known as ‘federalism with an unchanged Constitution’. The label ‘administrative federalism’ was
applied because sub-national governments were made responsible for all administrative functions
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(with some exceptions), even regarding matters where legislative power remained in the hands of
the state (Baldi & Baldini 2008, p. 88).
5. It is worth noting that various legislative decrees to implement the fiscal federalism law succeeded
one another in 2010–11 (and even through until 2013). The effect is that decentralisationmeasures
have also been applied very recently, leading to a contradictory bridge period (discussed later).
6. The national annual budget law for 2010 (Law no. 191/2009) and then Law no. 42/2010
established that for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 the cuts should amount, respectively, to e12
million, e86 million and e118 million.
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